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Abstract—The decision logic for the ACAS X family of aircraft
collision avoidance systems is represented as a large numeric
table. Due to storage constraints of certified avionics hardware,
neural networks have been suggested as a way to significantly
compress the data while still preserving performance in terms
of safety. However, neural networks are complex continuous
functions with outputs that are difficult to predict. Because
simulations evaluate only a finite number of encounters, sim-
ulations are not sufficient to guarantee that the neural network
will perform correctly in all possible situations. We propose a
method to provide safety guarantees when using a neural network
collision avoidance system. The neural network outputs are
bounded using neural network verification tools like Reluplex and
Reluval, and a reachability method determines all possible ways
aircraft encounters will resolve using neural network advisories
and assuming bounded aircraft dynamics. Experiments with
systems inspired by ACAS X show that neural networks giving
either horizontal or vertical maneuvers can be proven safe. We
explore how relaxing the bounds on aircraft dynamics can lead
to potentially unsafe encounters and demonstrate how neural
network controllers can be modified to guarantee safety through
online costs or lowering alerting cost. The reachability method is
flexible and can incorporate uncertainties such as pilot delay and
sensor error. These results suggest a method for certifying neural
network collision avoidance systems for use in real aircraft.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ACAS X family of next-generation collision avoidance
systems represents optimized solutions to Markov decision
processes (MDPs) using large numeric lookup tables [1],
[2]. The version for large manned aircraft, ACAS Xa, issues
vertical advisories to pilots and has become an international
standard [2]. Another version for unmanned aircraft, ACAS
Xu, issues turn rate advisories to remote pilots to avoid near
midair collisions (NMACs), and demonstrations have been
flown with NASA’s Ikhana aircraft [3].
The large size of the lookup table can be challenging for
current avionic systems with limited memory. Julian et al.
demonstrate that a neural network approximation of the table
can reduce representation size by a factor of 1000 without
increasing online computation time or diminishing operational
performance in simulation [4]. However, simulations check
only a finite number of encounter geometries and do not
guarantee that all possible encounters will be safely resolved.
While neural networks are efficient global function approxima-
tors, their output is difficult to guarantee, which can prohibit
their use in safety-critical systems.
Recent work on neural network verification has produced
many tools and techniques for providing guarantees of neural
network outputs given a bounded set of inputs. One tool,
Reluplex, extends the simplex algorithm to incorporate rec-
tified linear activation functions to search for a set of inputs
that satisfies all equations and constraints [5]. Another tool,
Reluval, uses symbolic bound propagation and a splitting
function to verify network properties [6]. Many other tools
exist that use ideas from optimization, reachability, and search
to verify properties [7].
These tools verify simple input-output properties for neural
networks. Katz et al. test prototype neural networks trained
on an early version of the ACAS Xu logic table to show that
intuitive properties hold, such as a strong right turn is advised
when the intruder approaches from the left [5]. However, these
properties are only sanity checks that ought to hold, but they
do not guarantee that safety will be maintained over time.
To guarantee safety, verification must include the system
dynamics to understand how the closed-loop system evolves
in time. Julian et al. use the system dynamics to derive
input-output network properties that guarantee closed-loop
safety [8]. Akintunde et al. use mixed-integer linear program-
ming to prove closed-loop properties of neural network agents
acting in neural network approximated environments [9].
Ivanov et al. use ideas from hybrid systems for verification
of closed-loop properties of sigmoid-activated neural net-
works [10]. Xiang et al. use a reachability method to over-
approximate a neural network controller’s output along with
reachability tools to bound state variable trajectories [11].
Julian et al. use reachability combined with neural network
verification tools to prove closed-loop properties [12].
This paper presents a reachability method that over-
approximates the neural network and system dynamics
to check whether an NMAC is reachable. If the over-
approximated system cannot reach an NMAC, then the real
system is guaranteed safe assuming the dynamical model
constraints hold. In addition, because some of the ACAS
X collision avoidance systems are still under development
and not publicly available, this paper presents two open-
source collision avoidance systems, VerticalCAS and Hor-
izontalCAS, that are notional examples inspired by early
versions ACAS Xa and ACAS Xu. These examples formulate
collision avoidance systems as an MDP and train neural
network representations. The systems and supporting code
are available at https://github.com/sisl/VerticalCAS and https:
//github.com/sisl/HorizontalCAS. Although this paper studies
the verification of notional systems, the methods and lessons
learned can still be applied to real collision avoidance systems
or other neural network controllers.
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The reachability method verifies safety for both collision
avoidance systems. The dynamic constraints are relaxed until
safety can no longer be guaranteed to determine the safe
range of aircraft accelerations and turn rates. The reachability
method is flexible, and this work explores how uncertainties
such as pilot delay and sensor error can be incorporated
into the reachability framework and proven safe. Additionally,
reachability can determine the region where the decisions do
not affect safety, which could be used to speed the verification
process by focusing on only safety-critical regions of the
state space. These results demonstrate how neural network
controllers in real safety-critical systems can be proven safe,
which could play a role in their verification and incorporation
into real systems.
This paper describes the general collision avoidance table
generation and neural network approximation methods in
Section II. Section III and Section IV describe the VerticalCAS
and HorizontalCAS collision avoidance systems respectively.
Section V presents the reachability method for safety ver-
ification, while Section VI and Section VII describe the
reachability results using VerticalCAS and HorizontalCAS,
and Section VIII concludes.
II. COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS
One method for generating the logic for collision avoidance
systems uses dynamic programming to compute scores for all
advisories in all discrete encounter states. The table grows
exponentially with the number of state variables, making it
challenging to store in certified avionic hardware. A neural
network can be trained to approximate the logic table and
significantly reduce required storage space [4].
A. Table Generation
The collision avoidance score table is generated by framing
the collision avoidance problem as a Markov decision process
(MDP) [13], [14]. An MDP is composed of states s ∈ S ,
actions a ∈ A, a reward function R(s, a), and state transition
probabilities T (s′ | s, a) that define the probability of reaching
state s′ by taking action a in state s. The solution to an
MDP is a policy pi(s) that maps states to actions in order to
maximize the accumulation of reward over time. The policy
pi(s) can be computed through dynamic programming by
defining state-action values Q(s, a), initially all zeros, and
recursively updating Q using the Bellman equation,
Q(s, a)← R(s, a) + γ
∑
s′∈S
T (s′ | s, a)max
a′∈A
Q(s′, a′), (1)
where γ is a discount factor to ensure convergence. After
computing Q(s, a), we may determine the policy pi from
pi(s) = argmax
a∈A
Q(s, a). (2)
The state-action values Q(s, a) form the logic table to be
compressed with a neural network. Although the network
could approximate pi(s) directly instead of all state-action val-
ues, systems like ACAS X use the values to compute the best
action in multi-intruder encounters, so this work approximates
the state-action values rather than just the policy [1], [4].
B. Neural Network Approximation
After computing the state-action value table Q(s, a), a
neural network representation denoted Q˜(s, a) is used to
approximate the table. Previous work shows that a neural
network representation maintains accuracy while reducing rep-
resentation size and outperforms other compression methods
such as decision trees or symmetry analysis [4], [15].
Neural networks are composed of layers, where the input
layer is the encounter geometry, the output layer contains the
action scores, and the middle layers are called hidden layers.
Each hidden layer is computed as an affine transformation
of the previous layer before applying a nonlinear activation
function. This work uses networks with rectified linear unit
activations (ReLU), defined as relu(x) = max(0, x) [16].
Defining x0 as the input to the network with L hidden layers,
the hidden layers can be computed as
xi+1 = relu (Wixi + bi) ∀i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L− 1}dot (3)
where Wi and bi are trainable network parameters. The
network output Q˜(s, ·) is computed without any activation
function, so Q˜(s, ·) =WLxL + bL.
The network parameters are initialized randomly and up-
dated with gradient descent methods to minimize a loss
function representing the error of the network. Typical re-
gression problems use a mean squared error loss function;
however, approximating Q(s, a) should also strive to maintain
argmaxa∈AQ(s, a) so that pi(s) is accurately approximated
as well. Nominal mean squared error weights both under-
and over-approximation errors equally, which could result in
changes to pi(s) if the value of the best action is under-valued
while another action is over-valued.
This work uses an asymmetric mean squared error function,
which heavily penalizes under-valuing the best action or over-
valuing the other actions [4]. In addition, a linear term is added
to the loss function for under-valuing the best action or over-
valuing the other actions, which strengthens the gradient when
error is small. The loss function `(s, a) can be written as
function of the prediction error e(s, a) = Q˜(s, a) − Q(s, a)
using
`(s, a) =

e(s, a)2, if a 6= pi(s) ∧
e(s, a) < 0
e(s, a)2, if a = pi(s) ∧
e(s, a) ≥ 0
c
(
e(s, a)2 + |e(s, a)|) , if a 6= pi(s) ∧
e(s, a) ≥ 0
c(N − 1) (e(s, a)2 + |e(s, a)|) , otherwise
(4)
where c is a scaling constant and N is the number of network
outputs. Increasing the scaling factor c penalizes the network
more if errors e(s, a) could change the policy, and the N − 1
term balances the fact that there are N−1 actions for a 6= pi(s)
but only one action for a = pi(s). In this work, c = 40.
For each epoch in supervised learning, state-action values
from the table are randomly split into smaller batches of
TABLE I
VERTICALCAS STATE VARIABLES
Variable Description Values Num
h (ft) Relative intruder altitude [−8000, 8000] 65
h˙own (ft/min) Ownship vertical rate [−6000, 6000] 39
h˙int (ft/min) Intruder vertical rate [−6000, 6000] 39
τ (s) Time to loss of hor. separation [0, 40] 41
sadv Previous advisory See Table II 9
Ownship
Intruder
τ
h˙own
h˙int
h
Fig. 1. Aircraft encounter geometry for VerticalCAS
512, and each batch is used to compute an average `(s, a).
Then, the neural network parameters are updated through the
adaptive gradient descent method Adam. The neural networks
are trained for multiple epochs until improvement stagnates.
III. VERTICALCAS
VerticalCAS issues vertical rate advisories to an aircraft,
called the ownship, to avoid near midair collisions (NMACs)
with another aircraft, called an intruder. NMACs are defined
as separation less than 100 ft vertically and 500 ft horizontally.
The state space is composed of five dimensions, as described
in Table I. The variables h, h˙own, and h˙int describe the vertical
encounter geometry. The variable τ captures the horizontal
geometry and acts as a countdown to the time when horizontal
separation is lost, at which point the aircraft must be separated
vertically to avoid an NMAC. The variable sadv represents
the previous advisory given, allowing the system to choose
new alerts consistently. The encounter geometry is shown in
Figure 1.
The action space, described in Table II, consists of nine pilot
advisories given at a frequency of once per second that dictate
the ownship’s acceleration. While COC allows the ownship to
choose any acceleration, the other advisories assume that the
TABLE II
VERTICALCAS ADVISORIES
Advisory Description h¨own range (ft/s2)
COC Clear of Conflict [−10.7, 10.7]
DNC Do Not Climb [−16.1,−8.33]
DND Do Not Descend [8.33, 16.1]
DES1500 Descend ≥ 1500 ft/min [−16.2,−8.33]
CL1500 Climb ≥ 1500 ft/min [8.33, 16.2]
SDES1500 Strengthen Descent to ≥ 1500 ft/min [−16.2,−10.7]
SCL1500 Strengthen Climb to ≥ 1500 ft/min [10.7, 16.2]
SDES2500 Strengthen Descent to ≥ 2500 ft/min [−16.2,−10.7]
SCL2500 Strengthen Climb to ≥ 2500 ft/min [10.7, 16.2]
pilot accelerates at an allowed acceleration until complying
with the target vertical rate, at which point the pilot stops
accelerating. If the aircraft already complies with the advisory,
then the aircraft is assumed to maintain the current vertical
rate.
The dynamic model can be written as
h
h˙own
h˙int
τ
sadv
←

h+ h˙int + 0.5h¨int − h˙own − 0.5h¨own
h˙own + h¨own
h˙int + h¨int
max(0, τ − 1)
s′adv
 , (5)
where the ownship acceleration h¨own is constrained by
sadv. The intruder is assumed to accelerate in the range
[−g/8, g/8]. To compute T (s′ | s, a), a simple distribution
is used where the mean acceleration has probability 0.5 while
the extremes have probability 0.25. Therefore, the distribution
T (s′ | s, a) will have nine non-zero entries for the different
combinations of ownship and intruder accelerations.
The reward function encourages the system to issue advi-
sories that maintain safety while limiting unnecessary alerts
and undesired behavior, which includes reversing the advi-
sory direction, strengthening or weakening the advisory, and
crossing advisories that make the ownship pass through the
intruder’s altitude.
Each state dimension of the VerticalCAS state space is
discretized into a number of discrete values as specified in
Table I, resulting in 36.4 million states. The MDP is solved in
a few minutes using Gauss-Seidel value iteration, resulting in
a large state-action score table [14]. As described in Section II,
the score table can be approximated by neural networks. This
work trains a separate neural network for each sadv, resulting in
nine networks. In addition, the reachability analysis discussed
in Section VI studies properties for intruder aircraft that
maintain level flight, so the intruder vertical rate input was
removed to simplify the networks, though future work could
incorporate intruder vertical rate. The networks have three
inputs, one for each remaining state variable. Each network
has five hidden layers of length 25 and nine outputs, one for
each advisory. Nine smaller networks are trained instead of a
single large network to reduce run-time required to evaluate
each network [4]. Each network was trained for 3000 epochs in
30 minutes using Tensorflow, resulting in nine neural networks
that reduce required storage from 1.22GB to 103KB while
maintaining the correct advisory 94.9% of the time.
Figure 2 compares the policies of the VerticalCAS table and
neural network representations where each pixel represents the
system advisory if the intruder aircraft were at that location.
The table uses nearest-neighbor interpolation while the neural
network is a function that can be evaluated at any point in
the state space. The neural network representation is similar
to the discrete table, but there are small differences that may
or may not effect performance. Section V describes a formal
verification approach to provide safety guarantees when using
a neural network collision avoidance system.
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Fig. 2. VerticalCAS policy for the score table (left) and neural network (right)
with h˙own = h˙int = 0 ft/min, and sadv = COC
TABLE III
HORIZONTALCAS STATE VARIABLES
Variable Description Values Num
ρ (ft) Range to intruder [0, 50000] 32
θ (deg) Bearing angle to intruder [−180, 180] 41
ψ (deg) Relative heading angle of int. [−180, 180] 41
vown (ft/s) Ownship speed 200 1
vint (ft/s) Intruder speed 185 1
τ (s) Time to loss of vert. separation [0, 80] 81
sadv Previous advisory See Table IV 5
IV. HORIZONTALCAS
The state space for HorizontalCAS is composed of seven
variables that define the encounter, as defined in Table III.
The first five variables define the horizontal geometry and are
shown in Figure 3. In this work, ownship and intruder speeds
are set to constant values, but the approach can be extended
to ranges of speeds as well. Similar to τ in VerticalCAS,
τ for HorizontalCAS represents a countdown to when the
aircraft must be separated horizontally to avoid an NMAC,
which occurs when horizontal separation is less than 500 ft
and vertical separation is lost. Additionally, sadv allows the
system to alert consistently.
The action space consists of five turning advisories of
different strengths and directions, which are listed in Table IV.
COC allows the ownship to turn freely while two weak and
Ownship
vown Intruder
vint
ρ
ψ
θ
Fig. 3. Aircraft encounter geometry for HorizontalCAS
TABLE IV
HORIZONTALCAS ADVISORIES
Advisory Description Ownship Turn Rate
COC Clear of Conflict [−1.5 ◦/s, 1.5 ◦/s]
WL Weak Left [1.0 ◦/s, 2.0 ◦/s]
WR Weak Right [−2.0 ◦/s, −1.0 ◦/s]
SL Strong Left [2.0 ◦/s, 4.0 ◦/s]
SR Strong Right [−4.0 ◦/s, −2.0 ◦/s]
two strong turning advisories constrain the turn rate. The
intruder aircraft is modeled to turn between [−1 ◦/s, 1 ◦/s].
The horizontal dynamics are more complicated than vertical
dynamics due to polar coordinates and because the state is
defined relative to the ownship’s position and heading direc-
tion. With ownship and intruder positions of (xown, yown) =
(0, 0) and (xint, yint) = (ρ cos(θ), ρ sin(θ)) respectively, and
assuming that the ownship and intruder maintain constant turn
rates uown and uint respectively, the aircraft positions after one
second will be
x′own =
∫ 1
0
vown cos(uownt)dt (6)
= vown
sin(uown)
uown
(7)
y′own =
∫ 1
0
vown sin(uownt)dt (8)
= vown
1− cos(uown)
uown
(9)
x′int = xown +
∫ 1
0
vown cos(ψ + uownt)dt (10)
= xown + vown
sin(ψ + uown)− sin(ψ)
uown
(11)
y′own = yown +
∫ 1
0
vown sin(ψ + uownt)dt (12)
= yown + vown
cos(ψ)− cos(ψ + uown)
uown
. (13)
Once the new positions are computed, the state variables
can be updated as
ρ
θ
ψ
vown
vint
τ
sadv

←

‖ [x′int − x′own, y′int − y′own] ‖2
arctan(y′int − y′own, x′int − x′own)− uown
ψ + uint − uown
vown
vint
max(0, τ − 1)
s′adv

. (14)
Similar to VerticalCAS, T (s′ | s, a) is a distribution where
the mean turn rate has probability 0.5 and the extremes have
probability 0.25.
The reward function is similar to that of VerticalCAS and
penalizes NMACs, alerts, reversals, strengthenings, weaken-
ings, and giving COC after a turning advisory when the aircraft
are still on a collision course. The HorizontalCAS state space
is discretized into 21.8 million states and, like VerticalCAS,
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Fig. 4. HorizontalCAS policy for the score table (top) and neural network
(bottom) with ψ = −90◦ τ = 0 s, and sadv = COC
solved in a few minutes with Gauss-Seidel value iteration to
create a large state-action value table [14]. This work trains
40 different neural networks, one for each combination of sadv
and τ ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 60}. Each neural network has
only three inputs, ρ, θ, and ψ, because the speed dimensions
are constant in this work. Each neural network has 5 hidden
layers of length 25 and 5 outputs, one for each advisory.
When the neural networks are used, the τ value is rounded
down to the closest value in τ ∈ {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 60}
and used with sadv to determine the network to be evaluated.
Each network was trained for 3000 epochs in 15 minutes each
using Tensorflow, resulting in 40 neural networks that reduce
required storage from 40.6MB to 442KB while maintaining
the correct advisory 97.9% of the time.
Figure 4 compares the policies of the HorizontalCAS table
and neural network representations. With ψ indicated by the
direction of the red aircraft in the upper right corners, each
pixel shows the advisory given if the intruder were at that
location. The neural network policy is similar to the score
table, but there are also key differences. The next section
describes a method for guaranteeing safety when the neural
network collision avoidance system is used.
V. VERIFICATION THROUGH REACHABILITY
The reachability algorithm uses open-source neural network
verification tools with the system dynamics to determine which
regions of the state space can be reached over time. This
method is similar to the work by Xiang et al. but uses discrete
actions and incorporates other neural verification tools [11].
Neural network verification tools like Reluplex [5] and Re-
luval [6] can determine whether an advisory is given at any
Algorithm 1 Reachability analysis for collision avoidance
neural networks
Input: R0, C
1: t = 0
2: while isSafe(c) ∀c ∈ Rt and Rt 6= Rt−1
3: t = t+ 1
4: Rt ← ∅
5: for c ∈ Rt−1
6: Compute Ac using neural network verification tool
7: for a ∈ Ac
8: Compute Rc,a using state dynamics
9: for c′ ∈ C
10: if c′
⋂
Rc,a 6= ∅
11: Rt ← Rt
⋃
c
12: if isSafe(c) ∀c ∈ Rt
13: return Safe
14: return Unsafe
point within a region of the input space. These tools can create
an over-approximation of the neural networks by splitting the
input region into smaller regions, referred to here as cells
c ∈ C, and computing which advisories Ac can be given
within each cell. In the reachability analysis described below,
we assume that any of these advisories could be issued from
any point within the cell, resulting in an over-approximation
of the neural network system. The results presented here use
Reluval, which performs quickly for small regions of input
space due to its use of symbolic bound propagation [6].
The analysis begins by initializing a set of reachable cells,
R0, which is the set of states that could occur before the
neural network takes action. For collision avoidance networks,
this would include all cells where either vertical or horizontal
separation is at maximum sensing range. Next, the system
dynamics are used to compute Rc,a, the region of the state
space that could be realized at the next time step from some
state within c ∈ R0 given advisory a ∈ Ac. If the system
dynamics are nonlinear, then Rc,a is an over-approximation
of the next states reachable from c. Then, R1 is computed as
the union of all cells that intersect with Rc,a ∀c ∈ R0, a ∈ Ac.
This process is repeated until either an NMAC cell is added
to the reachable set or R converges to a steady state with no
NMAC cells.
The reachability analysis is summarized in Algorithm 1. In
general, Rt may not converge to a steady-state set, but all
collision avoidance experiments eventually converged. If Rt
does not converge, then Rt should be checked for repeating
cycles. Otherwise, an inductive argument cannot be used to
guarantee safety for all time in the future.
Because the neural networks and system dynamics are over-
approximated, the reachability analysis over-approximates the
reachable set of real system. As a result, if the over-
approximated system cannot reach an unsafe state, then the
real neural network system is guaranteed to maintain safety.
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Fig. 5. VerticalCAS grid discretization
VI. VERTICALCAS RESULTS
This section describes the implementation and results of
reachability analysis for VerticalCAS neural networks.
A. Implementation
To implement the reachability analysis, the input space
must be discretized into cells. Although the networks were
created using a discrete table that covered the input space,
the table discretization does not need to be used again to
define the reachability cells. Smaller cells will decrease over-
approximation errors but increase computation time because
there will be more cells to cover the input space. Therefore,
the input space is split into smaller cells in critical regions
of the state space and coarser cells in other locations. For
VerticalCAS, regions where intruder separation is low is safety
critical, so those cells were made smaller. The discretization
used here is composed of 3D hyper-rectangles defined by 380
h segments that fill the range between −3000 ft to 3000 ft,
43 h˙own segments that fill the range from −2500 ft/min to
2500 ft/min, and 40 unit-length τ segments from 0 to 40 for
a total of 653600 cells. Figure 5 shows a density heat map of
the cells, which illustrates that there are more cells close to
h = 0 than where the intruder is far from the ownship.
After defining the cells, Reluval was used to compute
all possible advisories given within each cell [6]. All nine
advisories where checked with each cell, and all nine neural
networks were tested, resulting in 52.5 million queries for
Reluval. Reluval required 5.54 CPU-hours to solve all queries
and compute Ac for all cells in all networks, though wall-
clock time can be reduced through parallelization since each
query is independent.
Next, we compute Rc,a, the region of the state space reach-
able from cell c given advisory a ∈ Ac, so a bounded dynamic
model is needed. Although the original VerticalCAS MDP
uses acceleration constraints for each advisory, reachability
analysis would likely not be able to use the same constraints
to verify safety. The MDP framework uses a probabilistic
model and balances the risk of an NMAC with the cost of
alerting; however, reachability analysis is a formal method that
TABLE V
VERTICALCAS REACHABILITY ACCELERATION LIMITS
Advisory h¨own,min (ft/s2) h¨own,max (ft/s2)
COC −3− δ 3 + δ
DNC or DES1500 −12.2− δ −12.2 + δ
DND or CL1500 12.2− δ 12.2 + δ
SDES1500 or SDES2500 −13.4− δ −13.4 + δ
SCL1500 or SCL2500 13.4− δ 13.4 + δ
200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400
−410
−400
−390
h˙own (ft/min)
h
(f
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c
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Fig. 6. Reachability steps for VerticalCAS
determines whether an NMAC is possible with any probability,
no matter how small. Therefore, reachability analysis must
assume a more constrained dynamic model than what is used
in the MDP to verify safety. This section uses δ to test how
relaxed the acceleration bounds can be made before safety
cannot be verified. The acceleration bounds are shown in
Table V. With δ = 0, the non-COC advisory accelerations
are constrained to be the average MDP accelerations.
For cell c, which defines a small region of the input
space where h ∈ [hmin, hmax] and h˙own ∈ [h˙own,min, h˙own,max],
and advisory a, which defines acceleration limits h¨own ∈
[h¨own,min, h¨own,max], the region of states (h′, h˙′own) reachable at
the next time step, Rc,a, is bounded by
h′ ≥ hmin − h˙own,max − 0.5h¨own,max (15)
h′ ≤ hmax − h˙own,min − 0.5h¨own,min (16)
h˙′own ≥ h˙own,min + h¨own,min (17)
h˙′own ≤ h˙own,max + h¨own,max. (18)
Adding 2h′ to h˙′own in Eq. (5) eliminates acceleration,
leaving 2h′ + h˙′own = 2h − h˙own, which can be bounded to
give
2h′ + h˙′own ≥ 2hmin − h˙own,max (19)
2h′ + h˙′own ≤ 2hmax − h˙own,min. (20)
Figure 6 shows an example cell c with 500 points randomly
sampled and propagated forward, which are all contained
within Rc,a. The cyan boxes with diamond corners represent
Rc,a, the set of cells that overlap with Rc,a. This process can
be repeated for all cells in c ∈ Rt with all possible advisories
given in the cell to compile Rt+1.
−2 0 2−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
h˙own (kft/min)
h
(k
ft
)
τ = 24s
−2 0 2
h˙own (kft/min)
τ = 16s
−2 0 2
h˙own (kft/min)
τ = 8s
−2 0 2
h˙own (kft/min)
τ = 0s
Reachable
Unreachable
−2 0 2
h˙own (kft/min)
Converged
Fig. 7. VerticalCAS reachable set over time
TABLE VI
VERTICALCAS REACHABILITY RESULTS FOR DIFFERENT MODELS
δ (ft/s2) τ = 0 min. sep. (ft) Converged min. sep. (ft) Safe
0.0 390 530 Yes
1.0 375 530 Yes
2.0 215 510 Yes
3.0 200 510 Yes
4.0 113 420 Yes
5.0 101 420 Yes
6.0 12 N/A No
The reachability analysis begins with R0 as the set of
all cells with maximum τ , which is the τ value at which
the collision avoidance system begins issuing alerts. Rt+1 is
computed given Rt as described above, where τ counts down
by one second with each iteration. In addition, the cells where
h is maximum or minimum are added to each Rt+1 because
an intruder could appear from above or below with less than
40 seconds of horizontal separation. This process continues
until there is an NMAC when τ = 0, or when Rt = Rt+1.
B. Results
Figure 7 shows snapshots of the reachable sets for different
τ values with δ = 0 where the dark regions are reachable,
the light regions are unreachable, and the dashed red band
represents the unsafe NMAC region. Over time, the neural
network controller advises the ownship to climb or descend,
and by the time τ = 0 s the reachable set contains no cells
within the NMAC region. Furthermore, once τ reaches 0, the
intruder aircraft could be flying in the same direction with
the same speed as the ownship, so vertical separation may
need to be maintained for all future time to avoid an NMAC.
This can be shown by continuing reachable set computation
until steady-state is achieved without NMACs 29 seconds after
τ = 0, so the ownship is guaranteed to be safe for all time.
Though the neural network is safe for δ = 0, the pilot
may respond with different accelerations, so δ is increased
to relax the acceleration limits until an NMAC is reachable.
As δ increases, the pilot can respond more sluggishly, which
decreases separation until NMACs become reachable. Table VI
shows that the acceleration bounds can be relaxed by 5.0 ft/s2
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system that prevents multiple reversals (right) for three second pilot delay
while maintaining safety. Reaching an NMAC could be due to
over-approximation errors, so the method is unable to prove
that the real system will be unsafe.
C. Pilot Delay
Another component of pilot uncertainty is pilot delay in
which the pilot may take a few seconds to respond to an ad-
visory. Reachability can incorporate pilot delay by computing
Rc,a for any of the previous  advisories, where  denotes the
number of seconds of pilot delay. The reachability analysis
tracks which cells are reachable along with the sequences of
 previous advisories that could be given to reach each cell.
With δ = 0 and  = 3, there are many reachable NMAC
states, as shown in the left plot of Figure 8. These states exist
because the neural network continuously reverses the alerting
direction after the pilot ignores the advisory. For example,
if the intruder is just above the ownship, the system will
advise descend. However, if the pilot instead follows an older
advisory and climbs instead, the ownship will pass above the
intruder where the system may reverse its advisory to climb.
To address this issue, an online cost that prevents multiple
reversals could be used. This online cost can be modeled
by tracking the number of reversals along with  previous
advisories and continuing the previous advisory in cases where
the system would issue a second reversal. The right plot in
Figure 8 shows that NMACs will be avoided with pilot delay
if online costs are added to prevent multiple reversals.
TABLE VII
HORIZONTALCAS REACHABILITY TURN RATE LIMITS
Aircraft Advisory umin (◦/s) umax (◦/s)
Ownship COC −δ δ
Ownship WL 1.5− δ 1.5 + δ
Ownship WR −1.5− δ −1.5 + δ
Ownship SR 3.5− δ 3.5 + δ
Ownship SL −3.5− δ −3.5 + δ
Intruder N/A −δ δ
VII. HORIZONTALCAS REACHABILITY
This section describes the implementation and results of
reachability analysis for HorizontalCAS neural networks.
A. Implementation
To implement reachability, bounds on the state variables at
the next time step, Rc,a must be computed for some bounded
input region, c. Unlike VerticalCAS, the state dynamics are
non-linear and coupled as the polar coordinates are trans-
formed to Cartesian, updated, and returned to polar form. As
a result, computing RC,a in polar-coordinates is difficult and
results in loose bounds, which significantly increases over-
approximation errors. However, reachability with Cartesian co-
ordinates results in less over-approximation error, so this work
considers neural networks that use Cartesian coordinates as
inputs rather than polar coordinates. The same HorizontalCAS
MDP can be used to generate the table with state variables ρ
and θ, but the neural network training data uses x = ρ cos(θ)
and y = ρ sin(θ) instead of ρ and θ.
Similar to VerticalCAS, the cells are discretized in x (down-
range) and y (crossrange) more heavily near the NMAC region
and areas leading to that region.In addition, ψ was discretized
to 360 one-degree segments. The final discretization has 74.1
million cells and 14.8 billion Reluval queries, which required
227 CPU-hours to compute Ac for all cells in all 40 networks.
Next, reachability analysis must assume a constrained dy-
namic model. As with VerticalCAS, the variable δ is used to
relax the turn rate bounds as shown in Table V.
Computing Rc,a follows the same method as for Vertical-
CAS where upper and lower bounds are computed for each
state variable. The terms in Equation (14) can be rearranged
using Ptolemy’s trigonometric identities as
x′ = x+ vint cos(ψ)− vown − vowne1(u0) (21)
− vint sin(ψ)e2(u1)− v1 cos(ψ)e1(u1) (22)
y′ = y + vint sin(ψ)− vowne2(uown) (23)
+ vint cos(ψ)e2(u1)− vint sin(ψ)e1(u1), (24)
where functions e1 and e2 are
e1(x) =
x− sin(x)
x
(25)
e2(x) =
1− cos(x)
x
. (26)
Functions e1 and e2 represent error functions due to turning
that evaluate to zero when the input is zero. For small bounded
turning rates, we can compute bounds on e1 and e2 as well as
the other terms in the expressions for x′ and y′. To compute
bounds on x′ and y′, each term in the expressions can be
bounded individually in order to decouple the terms, and then
bounds on x′ and y′ are computed considering the minimum or
maximum of each term in the summation. Lastly, the bounds
on x′ and y′ must be rotated because the coordinate frame
of x and y is fixed to the ownship. Again, simple upper and
lower bounds are computed for a bounded ownship turn rate,
leading to the final bounds on intruder location at the next
time step. Bounds on ψ′ are easily computed as
ψ′ ≥ ψmin + uint,min − uown,max (27)
ψ′ ≤ ψmax + uint,max − uown,min. (28)
The resulting Rc,a is a hyper-rectangle that over-approximates
the set of states reachable from any state within c.
Similar to VerticalCAS, R0 is initialized as all cells with
τ = 80 s, the maximum value. The reachable set of cells
at the next time step is computed iteratively, and the cells
on the boundary of the sensing region are always added to
the reachable set to simulate an intruder appearing closer in
altitude but far away horizontally.
B. Results
Figure 9 shows snapshots of the reachable cells at different
τ values. Because the cells are three-dimensional but the plots
are two-dimensional, the color of the cell indicates the number
of cells reachable for that (x, y) location, i.e. the number of
intruder heading angles reachable at that location. The darker
red indicates more cells are reachable while blue indicates
fewer cells are reachable, and white indicates no cells are
reachable. The red dot at the origin represents the NMAC re-
gion. Initially, all cells are added to the reach state at τ = 80 s,
but over time the neural network collision avoidance system
clears an unreachable around the NMAC region. Because the
NMAC region is completely inside the white unreachable
region when τ = 0 s, no NMACs are possible at that time.
Furthermore, each iteration beyond τ = 0 s maintains a safe
unreachable region around the NMAC region, and after 115
seconds beyond τ = 0 s, the reachable set converges to a
steady-state set. As a result, HorizontalCAS is guaranteed to
avoid NMACs for the bounded dynamic model with δ = 0.
The reachability method proves separation of 1046 ft with
the current neural networks, but increasing δ slightly reduces
the safety margin and results in an NMAC. To prove safety for
more relaxed dynamics, either over-approximation errors must
be reduced by, for example, decreasing cell sizes, or a more
robust neural network must be trained. We created a more
robust neural network collision avoidance system by reducing
the alerting cost when generating the MDP cost table, creating
larger alerting regions. As a result, the neural network better
maintains separation but alerts more frequently. Figure 10
shows the final reachable sets for the retrained networks for
two δ values, which shows that the new neural networks can
avoid NMACs for δ = 0.2.
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Fig. 9. HorizontalCAS reachable sets over time
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Fig. 10. HorizontalCAS reachable set for the retrained networks with δ = 0.0
(left) and δ = 0.2 (right) once τ reaches 0
Additionally, initial studies with vint = vown could not verify
safety. Over-approximation errors allowed the intruder aircraft
to move closer to the ownship than what would really be
possible, which eventually leads to reaching an NMAC. In
general, this reachability method cannot guarantee safety in
cases where the intruder aircraft has as much or more control
authority than the ownship because the intruder will be able
to chase the ownship into an NMAC.
C. Safe Regions
Although HorizontalCAS begins alerting whenever an in-
truder enters the boundary of its sensing region, situations
could arise where an intruder is ignored until it is closer to the
ownship. For example, if there are multiple intruders present,
the ownship may be forced to get closer to one of the intruders
while avoiding the other. Reachability analysis can be used
to compute the largest region of intruder locations where an
NMAC will still be avoided.
The left plots of Figure 11 show sets for cells that satisfy
(x− vownt)2 + y2 ≥ (vownt+ d)2, (29)
where t is the amount of time for the ownship to maintain
separation of at least d feet from the intruder if the ownship
flies straight. With d = 2000 ft, the top row of Figure 11 uses
t = 20 s while the bottom row uses t = 24 s. The longer time
results in a larger circle omitted from the initial reachable set,
which is the difference between an NMAC and guaranteed
safety. This result signifies that the entire state space does
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Fig. 11. Verifying which initial reachable sets can be made safe for an unsafe
set (top row) and safe set (bottom row)
not need to be analyzed to prove safety, which could lead
to methods that improve computation speed by relaxing cell
discretization in areas of the state space that are unimportant.
D. Sensor Error
The reachability method can model sensor error by expand-
ing the cells’ boundaries when computing Ac by some amount
of bounded sensor measurement error. The cell bounds on x
and y were expanded outward by 5% of the range to the
cell center to model position error estimates of up to 5%.
However, making the cells larger increases the computation
time, and Reluval required two orders of magnitude longer
to compute Ac than without sensor error. In addition, safety
could not be verified because many cells issue both SL and
SR advisories from all possible sadv, which means the network
could continuously issue reversals until reaching an NMAC.
This issue can be fixed by more heavily penalizing reversals
or adding online costs to prevent multiple reversals.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We presented two open-source frameworks for generating
collision avoidance tables and neural networks inspired by
prototypes of the ACAS X systems. The VerticalCAS system
issues vertical rate advisories to avoid intruder aircraft while
the HorizontalCAS system issues turning rate advisories. A
reachability method was introduced that uses existing neu-
ral network verification tools to over-approximate the neural
network and computes all ways the input space will evolve
in the closed-loop system. The method was used for both
HorizontalCAS and VerticalCAS neural network systems and
demonstrates that both systems can be proven safe subject
to bounded state dynamics and pilot models. Trade-offs be-
tween the looseness of dynamic bounds and guaranteed safety
margins were explored. Pilot delay was incorporated, and
issues stemming from delay were addressed with online costs.
Furthermore, we demonstrated a method to generate a large
initial reachable sets that can still be proven safe, which can
be used to determine the region where the neural networks
decisions are critical for safety. Future work will study ways
to autonomously and efficiently discretize the input region
to reduce over-approximation errors in safety-critical regions
without adding more cells than necessary. The closed-loop
reachability approach suggests a method to one day verify
neural network controllers for use in safety critical systems.
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